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Abstract 
The theoretical price of gold futures relies on the term structure of interest rates, the days 
to settlement, and the spot price of gold. However, when comparing the theoretical gold futures 
price and the observed price in the market, there is often a difference. The difference implies that 
the theoretical pricing model is incomplete. Though limited in explaining much of what causes a 
difference between the actual and theoretical futures prices, factors such as rise in the credit 
spread of interest rates and changes in the price of commodities are statistically significant and 
positively correlated determinants of the difference between theoretical and observed gold 
futures prices. Gold futures, primarily an investment and commercial instrument to hedge against 
inflation and unexpected changes in commodities, exhibit prices that differ from the theoretical 
price of its futures contract. 
 
Introduction 
 Former Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke told the Senate Banking Committee in 
July of 2013 that “[N]obody really understands gold prices and I don’t pretend to really 
understand them either.” Indeed, gold prices are difficult to understand, and gold futures are at 
least as difficult to comprehend. However, futures have a theoretical framework to explain their 
price against the asset that underlies them, and this framework should apply particularly well for 
gold due to its trivial storage costs relative to many other commodities. However there are 
limitations to the theory. This paper will focus on explaining the daily deviations in gold futures 
prices from the price explained by the conventional theoretical framework. This paper explores 
what drives gold futures and hopes to use its discoveries to explain gold prices.  
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Background 
 Gold as an asset has existed for thousands of years, used primarily as a means of 
exchange since ancient civilizations, as well as a material used in artwork and medicine. Today, 
gold is used in dentistry and medical devices, jewelry, technology, and investing. According to 
the U.S. Bureau of Mines and the U.S. Geological Survey, jewelry and investing accounted for 
36.3% and 38% of 6,882 metric tons of gold collected from 1975 to 2003, respectively. Gold is 
used in certain industries because of its unique physical properties. Dentistry uses gold for 
fillings due to its durability and has been used throughout history. Technology and industry also 
use gold because of its conductibility, malleability and resistance to corrosion. 
However, these applications seem limited compared to some other elements found in the 
world, so why is gold so valuable? The answer lies in its scarcity. The World Gold Council 
estimates that the total amount of gold extracted from earth from ancient times to present day is 
158,000 metric tons, which is equal to a 20.15-meter cube—approximately equal to a glass-
encased tennis court filled to its maximum volume in gold. Therefore, along with some practical 
applications, gold’s value in weight comes from its limited supply. 
Gold’s presence in the financial markets lies within investors hedging economic risk. 
Because of gold’s scarcity, it appears to be a safe bet in times of crisis, however provides little 
return compared to financial assets. For instance, during the financial crisis of 2008, the S&P 500 
fell 40% from 2008 to 2009, while gold increased 1.34%. The behavior of gold is not an 
anomaly. Gold consistently has ended at a higher price exiting a recession than when entering a 
recession, while other common assets such as equities and fixed income often lag.  
Coincidentally, futures contracts are also a hedging tool. Gold futures provide protection for 
investors without buying the asset outright.  
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Figure 1: Historical Performance of Gold vs. SPX 
   
The second important foundation for this paper is the concept of futures contracts. 
Futures are asset contracts between a buyer and a seller used to lock in a price on the exchange, 
paid in full on a later date. Futures are often used for assets such as wheat, oil, coffee beans, 
foreign currencies, and of course gold. The contracts differ by which asset is attached to the 
contract, which in futures terms is called the underlying asset, or the “underlying” for short. 
Futures are traded in an organized exchange, which requires traders of the exchange to place 
“margin”—a percentage of the total quoted price—in order to hold the contract before settling at 
the expiration of the contract. 
The proliferation of futures is due to the benefits the financial instruments provide. 
Commodity production and marketing expose producers to risk. Wheat farmers, for instance, are 
exposed to falling wheat prices before the chance to reap their crop yield.  However, the farmer 
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can hedge—limit risk—by selling a futures contract for some of the crop. If the price of wheat 
does fall, the gains from selling futures mitigate the losses the farmer gets from holding wheat in 
the present—or “cash”—market. Conversely, a cereal producer knows that in the future he will 
need more wheat to produce cereal; however he does not need the input at the moment and 
would rather use his liquid assets for other purposes. Currently, the producer is at risk of rising 
wheat prices. The cereal producer could buy a futures contract to hedge his risk against rising 
wheat prices. In the event that wheat prices do rise, the producer can sell his contract for a profit, 
reducing the total cost of production. Alternatively, the wheat farmer and the cereal producer 
could simply organize a contract between each other so that the cereal producer takes delivery of 
the farmer’s wheat on an agreed upon price. In several ways, futures help facilitate commerce. 
Futures have other benefits that explain their use for transferring risk. The futures 
exchanges standardize quality, quantity, and delivery time for each contract. The standardization 
of futures and existence of exchanges allows for greater liquidity in the market, so the contract 
holder can get out the contract should liquidity needs arise. Additionally, futures provide a 
transfer of default risk from the buyer and the seller to the financial intermediaries that organize 
the exchange because the exchanges are financially sound and legal counterparties of every 
contract.  
Another benefit to futures is their minimal default risk, because exchanges require traders 
to adjust margin at the end of each trading day. Finally, futures promote specialization. 
Producers of goods focus on maximizing profit through production, while financial 
intermediaries and speculators focus on profit maximization through optimal pricing. Producers 
transfer risk to speculators. 
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The Cost of Carry Model 
 Due to their relative liquidity and standardized form, futures have a generalized pricing 
model that closely follows the prices represented in the market. The model is based on the cost 
associated with carrying the underlying asset until contract expiration. The costs associated with 
carrying the asset fall into four categories: storage costs, transportation costs, insurance costs, 
and financing costs. Commodities such as wheat or coffee must be stored before a buyer of the 
futures contract takes delivery of the asset, they must be insured to minimize the risk of spoiling 
due to water damage, theft, or other risks, and if there is a distance between the buyer and seller 
there is a cost associated with transporting the good. For gold, storage, transportation, and 
insurance costs are likely to be very small (Fama & French 1988). The largest cost, however, is 
financing the purchase of the asset and this is the most important cost when explaining the cost 
of carry model for gold. 
The cost of carry model works by analyzing the opportunities for arbitrage—risk-free 
profit—in the futures market. The first form of arbitrage is cash-and-carry arbitrage. An 
arbitrageur wishes to buy gold to exploit the possibly overvalued futures contract at time t = 0 
and sell at t = T. The arbitrageur can borrow cash to buy gold at $1,000 and use the asset as 
collateral. By doing so, he borrows at the risk-free rate of 5%.1 When it is time to settle the 
contract the arbitrageur delivers the gold he is holding against the futures contract and is thereby 
absolved of any further obligation in the futures contract. The total cost the arbitrageur is 
obligated to pay is $1,050 at time t = T—the amount he borrowed and the interest he owes on the 
loan assuming no other charges. If the arbitrageur receives a futures contract settlement price 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Defining	  the	  risk-­‐free	  rate	  will	  be	  discussed	  later	  in	  the	  paper.	  In	  the	  current	  example,	  risk-­‐free	  rate	  is	  equal	  to	  the	  minimum	  amount	  of	  return	  any	  lender	  would	  expect	  for	  an	  investment	  with	  zero	  risk.	  Additionally,	  the	  interest	  rate	  used	  is	  a	  hypothetical	  example—using	  a	  larger	  number	  than	  current	  rates	  to	  illustrate	  costs	  of	  financing.	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greater than $1,050, he succeeded in collecting a riskless profit. If there are numerous traders 
participating in the same strategy, then supply of futures contracts increases and the price must 
then fall to such a point that no arbitrageur could exploit the mispricing. Expressed as an 
inequality, the strategy’s arbitrage-free equilibrium price yields: 
(1) 𝐹!,! ≤ 𝑆!(1+ 𝐶) 
Where, F0,t is the futures price, S0 is the spot price, and C is the cost of carrying the asset 
forward, represented as a fraction of the spot price.  
  Yet equation (1) shows that the futures contract could be undervalued relative to future 
value of the spot price of gold.  If a contract is undervalued for a particular time interval from t = 
0 to t = T, arbitrageurs use reverse cash-and-carry arbitrage. In order to exploit the mispricing, 
the arbitrageur borrows the physical gold from another seller and then sells the gold short at the 
spot price of $1,000.2 The arbitrageur then buys a futures contract in gold, loans the money 
earned from selling gold short at the risk-free rate, receiving 5% interest. At the contract 
settlement date (time t = T), the arbitrageur collects his loan, uses the proceeds to take delivery 
of the physical gold at the futures contract price, and repays the short sale. If the futures contract 
settlement price was less than $1,050, then the arbitrageur collects a risk-free profit equal to the 
difference between the spot price where he sold the gold less the futures price. Again, many 
traders have an incentive to use the same strategy; because once the trade is completed there is 
no cost. The demand for futures then rises by arbitrageurs and so does the price, until there is no 
opportunity for risk-free profit using the reverse cash-and-carry. Expressed as an inequality: 
(2) 𝐹!,! ≥ 𝑆!(1+ 𝐶) 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Short-selling is when a trader sells an asset without owning it, with the expectation that the asset can be replaced at 
a cheaper price in the future and making a profit on the difference between the initial selling price and the 
replacement cost.	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Finally, the combination of the two rules yields: 
(3) 𝐹!,! = 𝑆! 1+ 𝐶  
To summarize the outcome illustrated in equation (3), an arbitrageur should not make any 
profit or loss if he sells the gold futures contract short and is long3 physical gold until the 
contract expires—or if the arbitrageur is long the gold futures contract and is short physical gold. 
This should make sense intuitively, because the only difference between the physical gold and 
the futures price of gold is the time value of money. 
Assuming other costs besides the cost of financing are trivial for gold, the price of gold 
futures depend on three pieces of information. First, the spot price of gold. The physical market 
for gold is like any other commodity, traded every day and changing in response to new 
information reflecting supply and demand. The second piece of information is the risk-free rate. 
The risk-free rate is the lowest possible return a lender would expect on an investment with zero 
risk4. In reality, the closest estimate to a borrower with zero risk is the U.S. Government5. 
Therefore, the term structure of Treasury interest rates is used to determine the risk-free rate. 
Finally, the number of days to settlement completes the cost-of-carry model. An investor can 
estimate the approximate interest rate to use as the cost of financing, and then applies the ratio 
between the number of days to expiration T to the number of days in a year to estimate the total 
cost of carrying an underlying asset. The final equation is expressed as: 
(4) 𝐹!,! = 𝑆!(1+ 𝑟) !!"# 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Long	  means	  that	  an	  investor	  has	  purchased	  the	  asset	  and	  intends	  to	  make	  a	  profit	  on	  the	  asset’s	  price	  appreciating.	  4	  The	  investment	  must	  be	  the	  risk-­‐free	  rate	  because	  the	  arbitrageur	  is	  looking	  for	  risk-­‐free	  profit.	  Using	  any	  other	  investment	  vehicle	  would	  mean	  the	  arbitrageur	  is	  taking	  risk.	  For	  instance,	  if	  the	  arbitrageur	  invests	  his	  short	  physical	  gold	  proceeds	  into	  a	  AAA-­‐rated	  corporate	  bond,	  the	  corporation	  still	  is	  at	  risk	  to	  default	  on	  its	  loans	  and	  the	  arbitrageur	  does	  not	  receive	  his	  investment	  with	  interest	  back.	  5	  The	  logic	  behind	  U.S.	  Treasuries	  as	  the	  risk-­‐free	  asset	  is	  because	  the	  U.S.	  government	  backs	  their	  creditworthiness.	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The rest of the paper focuses on comparing the cost-of-carry price to the observed futures 
price, identifying differences between the two prices, and offering possible explanations to the 
differences in price. Both market-specific and macroeconomic determinants will be tested for 
statistical significance and magnitude for explaining the variation in the futures price from the 
predicted price. Statistical results will determine the validity of a new theory, emphasizing an 
associated risk premium to the old pricing model of futures contracts. 
 
Literature review  
 Paul Samuelson developed a hypothesis that futures prices increase in volatility as the 
contract nears its expiration date (1965). Samuelson argued that price competition drives futures 
prices to a level equal to the expected spot price at settlement date. His argument implies the best 
estimate for the future price is the current price; therefore the expected change in price is zero. In 
sum, futures follow a “random walk” in response to new information that will equal the expected 
spot price at contract expiration. Intuitively, futures contracts further from expiration have little 
information to estimate the expected spot price, and so volatility is low. However, as the contract 
nears its settlement date, information becomes increasingly relevant to the expected spot price. 
More information causes greater price changes, and so there is more volatility closer to 
expiration date. 
 Samuelson’s paper is relevant to the hypothesis tested in this paper because it explains 
behavior of futures contracts beyond the cost-of-carry model. The primary assumption of 
Samuelson’s model, market expectations, may be the driving force behind differences in the 
actual price of futures and the estimated cost-of-carry price of futures. Traders become less and 
less certain of the price of gold as they reach further into the future, and so the “discount rate” of 
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information may be higher during the earlier days of the contract. Their assumptions may guide 
futures into higher or lower values than implied by the theoretical model, and the futures price 
becomes increasingly accurate to the cost-of-carry model when more information is available 
about the expected spot price.  
 A number of papers, specifically concerning forward currency markets, relate to 
Samuelson’s theory. After Samuelson’s paper on futures, Eugene Fama (1984) developed an 
empirical study on the unbiased forward exchange rate hypothesis. This hypothesis states that the 
forward exchange rate is an unbiased predictor of the future spot exchange rate, assuming that 
market participants are risk-neutral and have rational expectations. In other words, the difference 
between the expected spot rate and the current spot rate is equal to the difference between the 
forward rate and the current spot rate—ultimately suggesting that the forward rate must be equal 
to the expected spot rate6. Fama concluded that the regression coefficients in his empirical test 
were statistically significantly different from zero, suggesting that there is variation in the 
expected change in the spot price and forward price, as well as a difference in the forward price 
and future spot rate—so the cost of carry market leaves some mispricing left to explain. 
Thomas Chiang (1988) also tests the unbiased forward rate hypothesis discussed in 
Fama’s paper. Chiang’s results show that the unbiased forward rate hypothesis does exist in data 
used from January 1974 to August 1983. Yet further tests on subsamples within the time period 
show that the estimators within his regression depend upon what time period he chose. He found 
that the constant coefficient and the one-period lagged forward-rate coefficient change through 
the availability of new information within the market and is time-variant. His results conclude 
that regressions for certain time periods had constant coefficients significantly different from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  To	  clarify,	  the	  expected	  exchange	  rate	  is	  the	  exchange	  rate	  traders	  anticipate	  in	  the	  future.	  The	  forward	  exchange	  rate	  is	  a	  mathematical	  function	  of	  the	  current	  exchange	  rate,	  time,	  and	  interest	  rates	  between	  two	  currencies.	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zero and the coefficient for the difference between the estimated spot rate and the current spot 
rate significantly differ from one. Both conclusions were the same as Fama’s results, casting 
further skepticism on the unbiased forward rate hypothesis.   
The studies on forward rates  (Fama, Chiang, Naka & Whitney 1995) and the theory 
presented by Samuelson relate to the hypothesis being tested in this paper. If information and 
time can influence expected prices in ways that differ from the spot price observed in the market, 
then the cost-of-carry model may not incorporate fundamental parts that determine futures 
contract prices. However, the inconsistent results of such studies may also present opportunities 
to test the theory of unbiased forward rates in a new asset such as gold. 
 Fama and French’s (1985) research on “convenience yield” in metal commodities refers 
to gold futures and the cost-of-carry model (1985). Convenience yield relates to the storage and 
transportation cost that persists in some metal assets’ cost-of-carry model. Iron ore, for instance, 
has more value in the present than in the future to market participants, and so the futures price 
may be lower than the implied cost-of-carry price. Fama and French contend that marginal 
convenience yield on inventory rises as inventory decreases, modeling the effect of warehousing 
cost and the benefits of storing the commodity on the difference between a commodity’s futures 
contract price and spot price. One of the conclusions of the study is precious metal storage costs 
are low relative to the value of the asset, and demand for gold as an investment asset limits 
variation in convenience yields. Fama and French’s conclusion makes sense, considering the 
demand for gold is primarily driven by investment. As long as investors can be assured their 
rights of ownership to gold, the value of physically holding the asset compared to housing it in 
another location is negligible. 
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This paper relates to the study by Fama and French because both studies examine the 
potential causes of the difference between the spot price and futures price, beyond the simple 
pricing model that relies solely on interest rates. Additionally, based on their results, it is 
assumed that warehousing costs are not a significant determinant of price changes in the gold 
futures market when developing this paper’s econometric model. However, this thesis focuses on 
the expectations effect on pricing gold futures, as opposed to the storage costs and convenience 
yield in Fama and French’s paper. 
Another factor important in determining the risk premium on gold futures is uncertainty 
in interest rates. Kenneth N. Kuttner’s research in federal funds rate futures and the term 
structure of benchmark Treasury rates provides background information on the systematic risk of 
futures (2000). The study is important to this paper because it illustrates further the effect of 
interest rate shocks within the futures market. Kuttner hypothesizes that a change in the Federal 
Funds rate drives changes in the benchmark interest rate. The paper’s results show that 
unexpected FOMC Federal Funds rate changes drive changes in the term structure of interest 
rates, yet expected changes in the Federal Funds rate do not. Additionally, Treasury bonds are 
more sensitive to unexpected changes in interest rates, while shorter-term interest rates are less 
sensitive to changes in the Federal Funds rate. The study’s conclusion indicates that uncertainty 
factors into interest rate determination, to a certain degree. However, since the short-term 
Treasury rates are the interest rates most important in determining the theoretical price of gold 
futures, interest rate uncertainty may vary in magnitude by the number of days to settlement. As 
a futures contract reaches its settlement date, the difference between the futures contract price 
and the spot price becomes smaller. Therefore, unexpected changes in interest rates will create 
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larger fluctuations for contracts further down the gold futures term structure, similar to 
benchmark rates term structure. 
The issue with Kuttner’s paper is the way the Federal funds futures settlement price is 
calculated by taking the average of the month’s effective overnight Federal funds rate, instead of 
the rate that coincides with the settlement date. Additionally, the contract is not settled on the 
Fed’s target rate, but rather the effective Federal funds rate. These complications illustrate how 
the Federal funds futures contract may be the incorrect asset to analyze market uncertainty of 
Fed policy. This paper will improve upon Kuttner’s analysis by incorporating the three-month T-
Bill prorated for each trading day instead of the Federal funds rate.  
Melvin and Sultan’s paper on the variation in gold futures and exogenous forces such as 
South African political unrest and oil prices is also related to this thesis (1990). According the 
Melvin and Sultan, South African political unrest and oil prices drive the spot price of gold. If 
there is uncertainty or expectations regarding these factors in the future, there will be a premium 
associated with the futures price of gold. The hypothesis adds a risk premium factor to the 
theoretical futures price of gold, assuming that both factors positively affect the price of gold. 
South African political unrest and oil price changes are significant determinants of the 
conditional variance of the estimated spot gold price error. Both this paper and Melvin & Sultan 
identify causes that create a difference between the observed futures price and the estimated spot 
price, based on the assumption that futures pricing model for gold futures is incomplete. Yet the 
coefficients of the price of oil and South African political unrest were small in magnitude and 
left much of the variation in the futures and spot price left unexplained. This paper will improve 
upon Melvin and Sultan’s model to increase the pricing ability of the theoretical futures contract 
model. 
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The New Cost of Carry Model 
The futures contract cost-of-carry model shows that the future price is a function of the 
spot price, the risk free interest rate, and the duration of the futures contract—accounting for 
other costs besides financing. Based on previous papers (Fama & French 1988), gold does not 
have significant transportation or storage costs, so the only true cost is financing. This means that 
gold futures follow to the simplest form of the futures pricing model, as explained earlier in 
equation (4). However, the model may not translate into the real world, even in the gold futures 
market where financing costs hold the most importance to maintain the cost-of-carry 
relationship. The factor is the risk of uncertainty in the financial system. Mentioned earlier in the 
paper, futures provide the ability to hedge risk by locking in a price. If a speculator equally 
shorts the same amount of gold in the futures market as he holds in the physical market, then he 
is fully hedged and carries zero risk. However, there may be default risk within the futures 
market. As mentioned earlier, one of the benefit of futures is they are organized on an exchange. 
Financially sound exchanges minimize risk of default because the exchange serves as a legal 
counterparty to every transaction. Yet default risk may be a factor regardless outside of the 
futures market. 
 For instance, if an arbitrageur pursues the cash-and-carry strategy there are many ways in 
which default risk appears. First, he must post margin when shorting the futures contract. As the 
volatility of gold increases, the margin on gold futures increases and the frequency of margin 
calls increases as well. Treasuries can be placed in the margin account, so an arbitrageur can still 
receive a risk-free rate of interest. However, if the arbitrageur has to pay a higher interest rate on 
the short sale than the risk-free rate he is assuming a risk greater than zero. Additionally, the 
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arbitrageur needs to finance his purchase of physical gold by borrowing. Once again, if the 
arbitrageur must borrow at a higher interest rate than the risk-free rate the cash and carry trade 
becomes more difficult. Finally, if there is a greater uncertainty in gold prices, the trade becomes 
even more difficult—especially if the uncertainty in gold prices coincides with greater market 
turmoil and borrowing spreads increase for arbitrageurs against the benchmark Treasury rates. 
 The same default issues arise when discussing the reverse cash and carry strategy. Since 
the arbitrageur shorts gold and invests the proceeds in T-bills, posting margin costs nothing to 
him. Yet selling gold short might challenge the arbitrageur, since an owner of physical gold 
would most likely need either collateral or compensation for the trade. Once again, the cost of 
borrowing physical gold may cost more than the risk-free rate and will rise as market volatility 
increases. 
In sum, the risk premium is the arbitrageur’s default risk relative to a given settlement 
date. 
Expressed as a function: 
(5) 𝐹!,! = 𝑆! 1+ 𝑟 + 𝜌 !!"# 
where rho (ρ) is the additional spread on the risk-free rate. Rho is expected to be positive, and 
changes through market perception of new information. If default risk, borrowing costs, and 
uncertainty in asset prices are indeed a factor, then rho will have a direct relationship with asset 
volatility.  
Within this paper, the primary focus is the risk premium. This study will begin with a 
regression model similar to the unbiased forward rate hypothesis regression, and will conduct 
additional regressions to determine whether or not there is a risk premium within the price of 
gold futures. Uncovering what determines the risk premium will explain the deviation of futures 
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prices from its theoretical price, which will ultimately aid in explaining the difference between 
gold futures and their theoretical prices. Determinants to be examined include credit spreads 
(TED spread), commodities index volatility (GSCI volatility), and equity volatility (VIX). 
 
The General Regression Model 
 The empirical test is to see whether certain measures of volatility relate to the divergence 
of the actual futures price from the theoretical price. Therefore, the dependent variable (Yi) is the 
absolute value of the actual futures price less the estimated futures price, and the independent 
variables (Xi) will be measures of volatility and other exogenous risk factors. The total 5,574 
observations are further split into two groups, one is the occurrence of negative deviations of the 
observed price from the theoretical price, and the other is a group of positive deviations from the 
observed price. Two separate regressions are used on the groups. The purpose of separating the 
two groups is to observe the cash and carry and the reverse cash and carry arbitrage strategies 
individually and infer any differences between the two strategies. The regression is a stochastic 
model that includes a constant term (𝛼!) and an error term (𝜀!). The resulting model is expressed 
as: 
(6) 𝑌!" = 𝛼!" + 𝛽Χ!" + 𝜀!" 
The independent variables regressed against the difference in futures prices include the 
TED spread, implied equity volatility, and historical commodity volatility. The Treasury to 
Eurodollar (TED) spread is the number of basis points7 between the three-month Treasury bill 
and the ninety-day London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR)8. The TED spread describes the risk 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Basis	  Point	  is	  equal	  to	  1/100	  of	  a	  percentage	  point	  8	  LIBOR	  is	  the	  rate	  at	  which	  banks	  can	  borrow	  from	  other	  banks	  in	  the	  London	  interbank	  market.	  Recent	  controversy	  over	  global	  financial	  institutions	  manipulating	  LIBOR	  in	  the	  late	  2000’s	  could	  reduce	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  using	  the	  TED	  spread	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  interest	  rate	  market	  risk	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premium associated with the most capitalized borrowers in the world—financial institutions—
and the United States government. The TED spread captures short-term interest rate market risk, 
which will test the assumption that overall market risk creates fluctuations in futures prices. 
Higher TED spreads imply higher borrowing rates against arbitrageurs seeking financing for 
their trades.  
The Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) reflects a market estimate 
of future volatility, based on the weighted average of the implied volatilities for a wide range of 
option strikes. The VIX may drive gold futures prices upward, as an expected increase in equity 
volatility increases investor risk-aversion. Once again, the VIX is a form of market risk 
measurement, which could suggest higher pricing disparity between the theoretical and observed 
gold futures contract price. 
 Other commodities are correlated with gold prices, which suggests additional non-
diversifiable risk when owning a commodity. For instance, oil prices are correlated with gold 
prices, possibly due to oil producers using the commodity as a hedging tool (Melvin & Sultan 
1990). So the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (GSCI) historical thirty-day volatility will be 
included as another independent variable.  
 
Data 
 Obviously the most important data is gold futures prices. Gold futures prices are from 
Datastream, with support from Bloomberg data, collected from the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange Group Commodity Exchange Division (CME). Each contract is for one hundred troy-
ounces of gold, so a contract priced at $1,300 troy ounces is equal to $130,000 total. Quality and 
quantity are consistent throughout contracts, reducing statistical errors due to changes in 
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exchange policy. The contracts used are the futures contract closest to its settlement date (nearby 
contract), and the contract second-closest to settlement (first deferred), These contracts are used 
because the closer a contract is to expiration, the more liquid and active it will be. Liquidity is 
important because this study is concerned with determining whether tumultuous markets and 
other factors affecting the underlying asset are significant independent variables that influence 
the futures price. Insufficient liquidity could disrupt otherwise clearer results. By analyzing a 
contract with little open interest9, the price may indicate liquidity as a significant determinant of 
price differences above all else, weakening results. 
 In addition to the futures price, another value is a calculated futures price based on the 
cost of carry model. This value derives from the gold nearby futures contract and the three-
month T-Bill rate. In addition to gold futures data, the Treasury bill data and associated index 
data come from Datastream and Bloomberg. The nearby gold futures price is used instead of the 
gold spot price because of timing differences in determining market price. Treasury bill rates are 
also based on the consensus price of all contributors available on Datastream. Days to settlement 
are assumed to be constant because the model compares nearby futures to first deferred futures, 
so each daily calculation should have a constant sixty-day spread between the two. With all of 
the data available, the theoretical futures pricing model is used to calculate a theoretical value for 
the futures price. The contracts roll over bi-monthly, as gold futures contract open interest 
transfers from the current calendar month to the nearest calendar month as first notice of delivery 
approaches. The reason why there is a roll over period from one contract to another leading up to 
the earliest contract’s expiration is because most speculators have no interest in owning the 
physical asset. Extremely small differences will be expected to occur in calculations because the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  There	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  “volume”	  in	  futures	  markets.	  Instead,	  liquidity	  is	  measured	  by	  “open	  interest,”	  which	  is	  the	  number	  of	  contracts	  available	  for	  trading	  for	  a	  specified	  settlement	  date.	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interest rate is assumed to be constant over three months, whereas in the actual term structure of 
interest rates may only slightly differ. 
 The reason why the gold futures price is used to estimate the first-deferred contract with 
the cost of carry model because there is a timing differences between gold spot and the nearby 
contract. Reporting for both gold spot and Treasury bill rates occurs at 5:00PM ET. However, the 
price of the gold futures contract is not at the same time, and is rather a combination of the open 
outcry closing price and the electronic trading price. Open outcry is a form of trading in which 
buyers and sellers trade in-person with one another—often involving hand-signals and yelling 
out prices, hence the name. Open outcry for gold futures closes at 1:30PM ET, while electronic 
trading closes at 5:15PM ET. Datastream uses a consistent form for posting gold futures prices. 
The variation between the predicted and actual futures price due to timing would make poor 
estimations, which is why nearby futures contract price is used to estimate the first deferred 
contract.  
 
Series Observations Mean Std Error Minimum Maximum 
      Day 5574 2787.500 1609.220 1.000 5574.000 
Nearby 5574 633.136 445.636 252.800 1889.000 
Deferred 5574 638.025 446.986 253.700 1889.700 
Theoretical 
Def'd 5574 634.078 445.293 253.788 1889.016 
Deviation 5502 0.288 1.006 -11.836 39.029 
AbsVal 
Deviation 5502 0.484 0.927 0.000 39.029 
LIBOR 5574 3.359 2.178 0.235 6.869 
T-Bill 5574 2.850 2.047 0.000 6.240 
TED 5574 0.508 0.398 0.088 4.579 
VIX 5574 20.119 8.288 9.310 80.860 
GSCI 5574 19.741 8.674 6.260 66.180 
            
      	  
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
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Anticipated Estimation Issues 
 The regression used is a standard OLS model, however the model uses an adjusting 
calculation—Newey-West—to correct standard error issues in a heteroskedastic and 
autocorrelated residuals in the model. The general concept behind Newey-West is to incorporate 
a lagged adjustment to heteroskedastic and autocorrelated error terms. In the regressions used for 
this paper, there are nine lagged time-series variables that adjust the error terms. Other models 
such as Generalized Autoregressive Corrective Heteroskedasticity (GARCH), Common Filter, 
and other econometric techniques could provide alternative results. Based on multiple previous 
studies (Hess & Kamara 2005, Frankel 1988) and prior knowledge, financial asset studies have 
generally accepted the concept of non-constant, correlated variance over time. Newey-West 
adjusts these issues found in the parameter estimates to accurately interpret OLS results. Futures 
have many statistical features such as leptokurtic distribution as well as autocorrelation, which 
require further statistical tests and adjustments to correct for these problems (Kolb & Overdahl 
2007).  
 Leptokurtosis or the probability of having more observations outside more than one 
standard deviation compared to normal distribution is a common issue when dealing with futures 
over time. This problem is commonly known as distributions having “fat tails.” Though 
advanced econometric models correct for this issue, it is still important to know that making 
inferences of variables with such distributions is more risky. 
 In addition to leptokurtosis, futures are first-order autocorrelated (Kolb & Overdahl 2007, 
Fama, 1984). First-order autocorrelation means that a variable has a tendency to be either 
positively or negatively correlated to the observation immediately before it. Autocorrelation 
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creates biased estimates of the standard errors within an OLS model, and so models such as 
Newey-West, ARIMA, and GARCH minimize the bias within estimated parameters.  
 Finally, futures are heteroskedastic. Heteroskedasticity exists when a variable assumes a 
non-constant distribution. As mentioned in the Samuelson article, volatility tends to increase 
within futures prices as contracts reach their settlement date (2000). Therefore, futures prices 
display heteroskedasticity, conditional over time. Heteroskedasticity does not cause biased 
estimators, however it does cause the estimates of standard errors to be biased. With biased 
standard errors, testing for statistical significance in regressions is flawed and results will not be 
as reliable as a regression with a constant variance. This issue is resolved using the Newey-West 
error correction technique. 
 Based on all of the issues presented, regression models for gold futures must be taken 
into account the errors such as autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. The Newey-West standard 
error correction provides standard errors that do not reflect such issues. Another model worth 
using for the paper would be GARCH. The GARCH model can correct estimators for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, and test results must take into account the possibility of 
leptokurtic distributions (Wang 2011). 
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Results 
   
 
   Table 2A: Regression Results 
Dependent Variable: Absolute Value of Positive Deviations 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error     
     
Constant 0.18171 0.13031 Observations 3698 
     TED 
Spread 0.37462*** 0.05907 
Degrees of 
Freedom 3694 
     
VIX 0.01241** 0.00561 Durbin-Watson 1.3752 
     GSCI -0.00247 0.00374 R-Squared 0.05145 
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
 
*** = 99% confidence interval 
** = 95% confidence interval 
 
 
 
 
Table 2B: Regression Results 
Dependent Variable: Absolute Value of Negative Deviations 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error     
     Constant 0.03838 0.13057 Observations 1804 
     TED 
Spread 0.55131** 0.22790 
Degrees of 
Freedom 1800 
     
VIX -0.00842*** -0.00260 Durbin-Watson 1.0744 
     GSCI 0.00923 0.00565 R-Squared 0.05157 
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
 
*** = 99% confidence interval 
** = 95% confidence interval 
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The multiple regression results, shown in Table 2, prove supportive of the hypothesis; 
market risk does indeed reduce the efficiency of cost of carry arbitrage. The first independent 
variable, the TED spread, appears to be significant, both statistically and in magnitude. This 
result supports the hypothesis that the cost of financing increases disparities in the theoretical and 
actual futures prices. Furthermore, in cases of where there are negative and positive price 
deviations, there is a significant and positive relationship between the TED spread and futures 
mispricing. Using Newey-West standard errors, the TED spread variable is statistically 
significant at the 95% confidence level for positive price deviations, and the variable is 
statistically significant at the 99% level when there are negative deviations. Interpreting the 
coefficient, one standard deviation change in the TED spread (0.398) is expected to an average 
deviation of $0.18—calculated taking the average of the positive and negative coefficients. To 
put in terms of a single futures contract, a single “tick”—or price move of a futures contract is 
ten cents, and one contract is equal to 100 troy ounces of gold upon delivery. Therefore, one tick 
is equal to a ten-dollar price move. One must also consider that futures are bought on margin 
with leverage ratios ranging from 1:4 to 1:25. And so an approximate $0.18 difference is $18.43 
in contract terms, and adding the natural leverage that exists within futures creates a potential 
profit or loss ranging from approximately $73.72 to $460.75.  
Applying these calculations today, it is clear that the TED spread coefficient is significant 
in magnitude as well. Current margin requirements for a single gold futures contract closest to 
expiration is $7,975. As of March 8, 2014, the nearest contract trades at $1,339.50, and so the 
leverage ratio for gold futures is currently about 16.67. Considering current market conditions, a 
one percent increase in the TED spread would risk $307.23 of capital—a market loss of 3.94% 
for the smallest possible change in price differences. 
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 The positive, significant coefficient suggests that the risk-free borrowing rate is 
unattainable in the real world for even the most well capitalized financial institutions in the 
world that borrow at LIBOR. Additionally, regardless of whether or not contracts are relatively 
overpriced or underpriced relative to the cost of carry model, an increase in the TED spread will 
always increase the cost of arbitrage. The assumption of the cost of carry model is the arbitrageur 
could borrow at the risk-free rate to buy physical gold, and use the purchased gold as collateral 
on the loan. The empirical results illustrate that an arbitrageur will have to borrow at a spread 
greater than the T-Bill rate, even if he has gold as his collateral. 
 Another statistically significant variable is the CBOE thirty day Implied Volatility Index. 
The multiple regression results show that the VIX is statistically significant at the 95% 
confidence level in cases of positive deviations between the observed and calculated price of 
futures contracts. Using the same calculations as the TED spread to determine economic 
significance, one standard deviation increase the in VIX (8.288) is expected to make a loss of a 
single contract equal to $17.14 under the condition that the arbitrageur performs a cash and carry 
trade. The results of the regression support the hypothesis that greater market volatility cause 
cost of carry arbitrage to weaken as an effective valuation and strategy. 
 However, in circumstances when the market price is less than the cost of carry price, an 
increase the VIX is expected to cause price deviations to decline—holding all other variables 
constant. The expected decrease in the mispricing would be equal to $11.63, given the standard 
deviation of the VIX and the regression coefficient. The negative value on the regressor is 
particularly interesting. One possible explanation is because gold is considered a safe-haven 
asset, when the equity markets experience greater volatility investors buy gold and gold-linked 
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derivatives. The increase in demand for gold and its futures would then push prices upward, 
reducing the negative disparity between market and cost of carry prices.  
 The GSCI coefficient in the multiple-regression is not statistically significant. Comparing 
the multiple regression results to the simple linear model results in Table 3 (shown in 
Appendix)—with GSCI as the regressor—it is clear that adding other measurements of market 
risk change the significance of the variable. In a simple OLS model with Newey-West standard 
errors, GSCI volatility does appear to be statistically significant, however it is only statistically 
significant in cases where the market price is greater than the cost of carry price. A single unit 
increase in the GSCI is expected to widen the positive deviation between the theoretical first-
deferred gold futures contract and the actual contract by approximately $0.014. Once again, 
when interpreting the magnitude by actual investment losses or gains, the coefficient becomes 
quite a large economic effect when assuming a standard error change in the volatility of the 
GSCI (8.674). 
 However, GSCI historical volatility loses both statistical significance and economic 
significance when added to the multiple regression. The TED spread and VIX provide a stronger 
relationship between cost of carry price deviation. There may be multicollinearity between the 
variables, which could explain the loss of statistical significance in the GSCI coefficient. 
Multicollinear regressions still provide unbiased estimators—assuming the all other requirements 
of OLS are satisfied—and so the GSCI could possibly be a significant indicator, though not 
economically significant when positive price deviations occur. 
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Conclusion 
 Based on the multiple regression model’s results, it is clear that volatility weakens the 
cost of carry model’s accuracy of pricing futures contracts. Most notably, the TED spread creates 
the largest variation in prices compared to the other regressors. This particular result makes 
sense, considering the emphasis of financing costs associated with the cost of carry model. If the 
risk-free rate is not attainable for financial institutions, then the interest rates offered to 
arbitrageurs is at least as expensive as the financial institutions’ borrowing rates. Loans for 
purchasing gold, interest on margin accounts, all of these factors could expose an arbitrageur to 
higher interest rates. These higher interest costs could drive an arbitrageur to buying riskier 
assets for higher interest payments, making the cost of carry trade a speculative bet than a risk-
free arbitrage strategy. 
 Equity volatility also contributes to wider positive deviations between the market price 
and gold futures cost of carry price. This result suggests that other forms of market risk also 
make arbitrage more difficult to execute. The GSCI historical volatility is not statistically 
significant, however the coefficients of the GSCI when the market price is less than cost of carry 
price still illustrates the relationship between market risk and cost of carry pricing. 
 The primary argument of this paper was to determine whether or not the cost of carry 
model has inconsistencies that weaken its credibility as the model for futures pricing. Based on 
the results of the regressions, it is clear that the cost of carry model may not account for the 
numerous instances when interest rates and default risk increase the cost of arbitrage. Much like 
the failure of Long Term Capital Management during the Asian financial crisis and Russian 
financial crisis, arbitrage is effective in low market volatility and costs of borrowing can be 
anticipated. However, when volatility rises, uncertainty drives rapid price fluctuations, raises 
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interest rates, and the amount of leverage an investor assumes can exacerbate the loss of 
capital—combining these factors creates a feedback effect and mispricing becomes greater and 
more prevalent. In the instance of gold futures, the amount of leverage is inherently high, and 
uncertainty is non-diversifiable in a global financial market. The undertones of market risk keep 
borrowing rates high for any borrower besides the U.S government, and so the cost of carry 
arbitrage price is unattainable for even the most well capitalized financial institutions in the 
world.  
In order to have more accurately price gold futures, credit risk of an investor must be 
taken into consideration. Therefore, the effective time value of money interest rate in the cost of 
carry model should be an interest rate that fluctuates higher in volatile markets such as ninety-
day LIBOR, instead of the U.S. T-Bill rate which generally falls as investors flood safe-haven 
assets10. 
 Finally, some improvements to this paper would be to include dummy variables for years 
when price deviations were particularly high. This addition would be to examine whether 
statistically significant price differences only exist in times of financial crisis. Also, 
incorporating exogenous factors beyond credit risk and volatility may improve the explanatory 
power of the model. Other additions include using different estimation models, besides OLS with 
Newey-West error terms, and comparing the results to check parameter estimations. Also, 
incorporating daily margin requirements as another independent variable in the model to see if 
higher capital requirements cause barriers to market entry and widen price deviations.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Safe-­‐haven	  assets	  are	  liquid	  assets	  that	  appreciate	  in	  price	  in	  times	  of	  crisis,	  due	  to	  investors’	  increase	  in	  risk-­‐aversion.	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Appendix 
Table 3: Separate Simple Linear Regression Model of Each Independent 
Variable 
3.1A 
    Dependent Variable: Absolute Value of Positive Deviations 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error     
     
Constant 0.3301205375*** 0.039580724 Degrees of Freedom 3696 
     TED 
Spread 0.4782032614*** 0.076418288 R-squared 0.0443525 
     
3.1B     
Dependent Variable: Absolute Value of Negative Deviations 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error   
     
Constant 0.041444733 0.096996843 Degrees of Freedom 1802 
     TED 
Spread 0.5160365283** 0.219896742 R-Squared 0.0432279 
     
3.2A     
Dependent Variable: Absolute Value of Positive Deviations 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error   
     
Constant 0.154488814 0.113690909 Degrees of Freedom 3696 
     VIX 0.0204358694*** 0.006023624 R-Squared 0.0317278 
     
3.2B     
Dependent Variable: Absolute Value of Negative Deviations 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error   
     
Constant 0.271721604 0.059712618 Degrees of Freedom 1802 
     VIX 0.001441212 0.003393197 R-Squared <.001 
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3.3A     
Dependent Variable: Absolute Value of Positive Deviations 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error   
     
Constant 0.279587326 0.114732321 Degrees of Freedom 3696 
     GSCI 0.013594121 0.005609035 R-Squared 0.014094 
     
3.3B     
Dependent Variable: Absolute Value of Negative Deviations 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error   
     
Constant 0.195675378 0.081650887 Degrees of Freedom 1802 
     GSCI 0.006541689 0.00546651 R-Squared <.001 
 
Table 4: Correlation Coefficients Matrix 
Sample size 3698       
     
  TED VIX GSCI 
     TED Correlation Coeff. 1.     
 R Standard Error    
VIX Correlation Coeff. 0.50777 1.  
  0.0002   
GSCI Correlation Coeff. 0.43102 0.63958 1. 
 R Standard Error 0.00022 0.00016  
          
      
